PNpM CLI

pnpm/pnpm last check 2026-06-18 18:05 UTC 285 releases today

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Release notes

vpnpm 11.4

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Minor Changes

Treat tarball-integrity mismatches against the lockfile as a hard failure by default. Previously, pnpm install (non-frozen) would log ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_INTEGRITY, silently re-resolve from the registry, and overwrite the locked integrity — which meant a compromised registry, proxy, or republished version could substitute attacker-controlled content on a clean machine even though the project shipped a committed lockfile.

pnpm install now exits with ERR_PNPM_TARBALL_INTEGRITY and a hint pointing at the new opt-in flag.

The only opt-in is pnpm install --update-checksums — narrowly scoped to refreshing the locked integrity values from what the registry currently serves. Mirrors yarn's flag of the same name. A warning still prints when the bypass takes effect so the operation is auditable.

--force and pnpm update deliberately do not bypass the integrity check. They are routine refresh operations; silently overwriting a locked integrity in those flows would erase the protection a committed lockfile is supposed to provide. --frozen-lockfile behavior is unchanged. --fix-lockfile keeps its documented purpose (filling in missing lockfile entries) and is also not a bypass.
pnpm runtime set <name> <version> now saves the runtime to devEngines.runtime by default instead of engines.runtime. Pass --save-prod (or -P) to save it to engines.runtime instead #11948.

Patch Changes

Fix a credential disclosure issue where an unscoped _authToken (or _auth, or username + _password, or tokenHelper) defined in one source — ~/.npmrc, ~/.config/pnpm/auth.ini, a workspace .npmrc, CLI flags, etc. — would be sent as an Authorization header to whichever registry a different (potentially untrusted) source named. The same fix extends to client TLS credentials (cert, key) so they aren't presented to a registry their author didn't choose.

pnpm now rewrites each unscoped per-registry setting (_authToken, _auth, username, _password, tokenHelper, cert, key) to its URL-scoped form at load time, using the registry= value declared in the same source (or the npmjs default registry if the source declares none). A later layer overriding registry= therefore cannot pull an unscoped credential along, because it is already pinned to the URL its author intended. ca/cafile are intentionally not rescoped — they're trust anchors, not credentials, and corporate MITM-proxy setups rely on them applying globally.

Every rescope emits a deprecation warning telling the user where the setting was pinned and how to write it directly. npm has rejected unscoped credentials outright since npm@9, and pnpm intends to remove support in a future major release. To target a specific registry, write the setting URL-scoped (e.g. //registry.example.com/:_authToken=... or //registry.example.com/:cert=...).

@pnpm/network.auth-header: removed the defaultRegistry parameter from createGetAuthHeaderByURI and getAuthHeadersFromCreds. Now that credentials are URL-scoped at load time, the merged configByUri never contains the empty-string "default registry" placeholder slot, so re-keying it onto the merged default registry is no longer needed.
Fix pnpm deploy crashing with ENOENT: ... lstat '<deployDir>/node_modules' when configDependencies declares pacquet (pacquet or @pnpm/pacquet). The deploy directory never installs config dependencies, so the install engine they designate isn't on disk to invoke; the nested install now skips them.
Reject git resolutions whose commit field is not a 40-character hexadecimal SHA before invoking git. A malicious lockfile could otherwise smuggle a value such as --upload-pack=<command> through git fetch / git checkout, which on SSH or local-file transports executes the supplied command.
Limit concurrent project manifest reads while listing large workspaces to avoid EMFILE errors.
Reject patch files whose diff --git headers reference paths outside the patched package directory. Previously a malicious .patch file added via a pull request could write, delete, or rename arbitrary files reachable by the user running pnpm install.
Improve the log message that pnpm prints after auto-adding entries to minimumReleaseAgeExclude when minimumReleaseAge is set without minimumReleaseAgeStrict. The message previously referred to the internal "loose mode" terminology, which wasn't searchable in the docs; it now tells the user to set minimumReleaseAgeStrict to true if they want these updates gated behind a prompt instead #11747.
Reject dependency aliases that contain path-traversal segments (such as @x/../../../../../.git/hooks) when reading them from a package manifest or symlinking them into node_modules. A malicious registry package could otherwise use a transitive dependency key to make pnpm install create symlinks at attacker-chosen paths outside the intended node_modules directory.
Reject pnpm-lock.yaml entries whose remote tarball resolution: block is missing the integrity field. Previously the worker that extracts a downloaded tarball skipped hash verification when no integrity was supplied and minted a fresh one from the unverified bytes, so an attacker who could both alter the lockfile (e.g. via a pull request that strips integrity:) and serve modified content at the referenced tarball URL could install a tampered package without any error — including under --frozen-lockfile. pnpm now fails closed at lockfile-read time with ERR_PNPM_MISSING_TARBALL_INTEGRITY. Git-hosted tarballs (gitHosted: true or a URL on codeload.github.com / bitbucket.org / gitlab.com) and file: tarballs are exempt — the commit SHA in a git-host URL and the user-controlled local path already anchor the bytes.
Validate devEngines.runtime and engines.runtime version ranges for node, deno, and bun when onFail is set to error or warn. Previously these settings only had an effect with onFail: 'download' — the error and warn modes silently did nothing #11818. Violations now throw ERR_PNPM_BAD_RUNTIME_VERSION.
Require provenance before treating trusted publisher metadata as the strongest trust evidence.

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